The Balkans Crisis and Kosovo
The Balkans Crisis and Kosovo
Since the day the crisis erupted, Hungarian policy took a cautious approach, a conduct by and large similar to that of the Western powers. It sought to avoid conflict and within its means, support the efforts of the international organizations aimed at settlement and preventing an escalation of the conflict. Its direct reactions were more political and only very rarely military in nature.
The Hungarian attitude was rooted in a number of factors. First of all the realization that the country will continue to be neighbor of the parties at war, that is Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. It was thus in its fundamental interest to keep equal distance in the long term, which however failed to conceal the fact that Hungarian public opinion was more favorable towards Slovenia and Croatia than towards Serbia. Secondly, behind steps directed against Serbia, there lay the knowledge of minority asymmetry, the direct threat of Hungarians in Vojvodina and the desire to keep them from becoming hostage minorities in an escalating conflict. Thirdly, the differences in military capabilities also had to be taken into account, which was unfavorable for Hungary especially during the period following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In the military campaign of NATO in Kosovo, the three new member states had to note that newly gained membership does not mean instant operational interoperability with the Alliance and that even adherence to “minimum military requirements” makes cooperation awkward. Last but not least, both the reception of refugees and the economic consequences of the war in Yugoslavia put an unforeseen burden on the Hungarian economy and society.
Since 1996, Hungary has contributed to the settlement of the crisis in former Yugoslavia in four areas: 1) It allowed the transit of troops of nations participating in the mission. 2) It provided host nation support to the IFOR-organization temporarily based in Hungary. 3) It sent an engineer battalion to the mission in Bosnia. 4) It sent a battalion to the KFOR mission.
Participation in the resolution of the Bosnia crisis and the war in Kosovo proved to be very important for Hungary because it offered a chance to demonstrate in practice that is was able and willing to participate in settling the problems of a European crisis and that it felt a political responsibility for the peace of the continent. In technical and military terms the Hungarian Defence Forces were part of a live, NATO-led mission. This practical cooperation offered a wealth of experience for soldiers and politicians alike, even if the initial contribution was very limited. Because of special Hungarian interests NATO’s leadership respected the request of Hungary, asking that should a ground invasion be considered, it should not be from Hungarian territory. The Hungarian government, however, adhered to the Allied concept for settlement when in April 1999, it turned back a Belorussian-Russian convoy carrying humanitarian aid on paper, which in fact consisting of equipment which could easily be converted into war material, and also rejected the request of air transit for six Russian IL-76 transport aircraft. This brought about in a freeze in Russian-Hungarian ties overnight.
The Kosovo-crisis and the Hungarian participation with a guard and security battalion (from July 1999) again highlighted the fact that Hungarian defence capabilities and the budget were inadequate, especially when it came to international peacekeeping missions.
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